United States Army Air Forces Research Articles

The United States Army Air Force Bombing Campaign Against the Leuna Synthetic Fuel Plant in 1944-45 and the German Response

The Leuna chemical plant in Eastern Germany was initially developed during the First World War to produce artificial nitrogen for use in explosives. The world’s first production of synthetic fuel from brown coal commenced at Leuna in 1927. From 1933 the Nazi government began to prepare for war and heavily expanded the Leuna complex to ensure that Germany had sufficient resources of fuel, nitrogen and rubber to support short campaigns. The synthetic fuel production technology developed in Leuna was also transferred to thirteen other sites in Greater Germany. Commencing on 12 May 1944 the USAAF, and later the RAF, undertook a sustained bombing campaign against Leuna and the other synthetic fuel plants. However, due to the critical importance of Leuna to the war effort, the German state devoted significant resources to the defence of the plant, and to its repair and the maintenance of production. The USAAF and RAF attacked Leuna on 21 subsequent occasions until production finally ceased in March 1945. This sustained bombing ultimately overcame the Leuna workforce’s ability to repair the utilities but did not seriously damage the core production equipment. This paper uses German, American and British archival sources to explore in detail the nature and impact of the air campaign against Leuna and to examine and explain the ways in which the Germans sought, with some success, to keep the plant operational. In addressing the bombing campaign from an alternative perspective, primarily from the ground looking up, the paper offers new insight into a topic most commonly viewed from the perspective of the Allied forces.

미국 공군의 독립과정 연구: 역사적 신제도주의 관점으로

미국의 항공력은 군사력 육성권, 군사력 운용권, 군사전략 결정권이란 자주권 확보 과정을 거치며 1947년 국가안전보장법의 제정과 함께 육군으로부터 독립하였다. 그 과정에서 육군항공지원대(USAAS: United States Army Air Service)는 육군항공단(USAAC: United States Army Air Corps), 육군항공대(USAAF: United States Army Air Force), 미국 공군(USAF: United States Air Force)으로 ‘조직의 개편’이 이루어졌고, ‘사령관의 권한범위’ 측면에서는 항공력을 조달하고 육성하는 권한에서, 본토 내 항공력을 통합적으로 운용하는 권한, 나아가 전 지구적으로 항공력을 운용할 수 있는 권한을 얻게 되었다.<BR>본 논문의 목적은 새로운 군의 형성 요인을 설명하기 위해 ‘미국 공군의 독립’을 역사적 신제도주의 관점으로 분석하는 것으로, 두 가지 함의를 제공한다. 먼저, 새로운 군의 형성을 위해선 ‘시장적 맥락’, ‘제도적 맥락’, ‘기폭 사건’의 세 가지 조건을 만족해야 한다. 이에 따라 해당 군과 관련된 방산업계의 호황이 필요하고, 할당받는 예산의 비율이 타 조직에 비해 우월해야 할 것이다. 또한, 기존과는 다른 새로운 개념의 무기와 새로운 임무 및 교리가 등장해야 할 것이다. 마지막으로 내·외부적으로 국가 지도자의 의지에 직접적 영향을 줄 기폭사건이 필요할 것이다. 이러한 이론적 틀은 미국 공군뿐만이 아닌 기존의 군으로부터 독립한 다른 많은 사례들을 설명할 분석의 도구로 사용될 수 있으며, 2019년 독립한 미국 우주군의 사례에도 적용될 수 있다는 점에서 의의를 갖는다.

‘I do feel good because my stomach is full of good hotcakes’: Comfort Food, Home and the USAAF in East Anglia during the Second World War

AbstractThis article analyses the important role that food played in providing ‘comfort’ to the service personnel of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) serving in East Anglia during the Second World War. Current theories on comfort food will be discussed before an examination of letters, diaries, and memoirs held by the 2nd Air Division Memorial Library (2ADML), Norwich, UK. It is clear that food played an important role in maintaining morale. Certain foods had the ability to evoke nostalgic thoughts of home. Not only did the food provide solace, it also reminded the troops of what they were fighting for. This article also demonstrates that USAAF personnel in East Anglia had a wide selection of foods from which they could gain comfort.

NARA Escape and Evasion Reports

This Research Note gives a brief introduction to the series of Escape and Evasion reports held by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Making up a rich source base, these documents can be used to explore the operational history of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF), the history of MIS-X, escape and evasion planning during the Second World War, diplomatic history, and social history. In addition, they offer a very compelling story of the relationships that flourished between aircrews and European civilians during the war.

Vernacular memorialization in the military: personal acts of remembrance at RAF Thorpe Abbotts

ABSTRACTIn September 2017, an archaeological excavation at RAF Thorpe Abbotts (also known as Station 139) uncovered 7 identification ‘dog’ tags belonging to airmen of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF). It is the thesis of this article that these were purposefully buried by individuals within the 100th Bomb Group (Heavy) as acts of remembrance. Alongside the dog tags were a number of other artefacts, including coins, bottles, and a canteen cup. These likely formed the material culture of self-developed grieving rituals established by the primary group responsible for the deposition of the dog tags.

Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two: The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940–43 (review)

Reviewed by: Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two: The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940–43 Richard R. Muller Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two: The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940–43. By Brad William Gladman. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. ISBN 978-0-230-22133-8. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xix, 252. $69.95. Tactical aviation came of age in the Second World War. Most accounts emphasize the early German prowess in devising and employing workable airground support procedures, with the Western Allies falling behind. Only in the Mediterranean in 1942–1943 did the Allies belatedly learn the techniques of effective battlefield air support, which were only gradually disseminated to the Royal Air Force (RAF) and United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) at large. In recent years, much excellent scholarship (including fine biographies of the two main RAF protagonists, Sir Arthur Tedder and Sir Arthur Coningham), has appeared. There is a greater understanding of the strides made by Allied tactical air forces in the crucial 1940–1943 period and their role in the eventual Anglo-American victory in the Mediterranean and the West. This brief, well-researched book adds greatly to that understanding. Gladman argues that successful tactical aviation is not merely the product of doctrine or equipment, but also depends upon a complex relationship between command, control communications, and intelligence (C3I). He starts with a perceptive analysis of the state of prewar British air support theory and practice, noting that the RAF had actually amassed a considerable body of useful army cooperation experience in the years spent policing the British Empire. The RAF’s failure was in not devising a doctrine based on these experiences, leaving it ill-prepared for the [End Page 1370] challenges of 1940. Nevertheless, the air policing experience provided a “vital base” for subsequent wartime developments. The heart of the book is an examination of how the RAF honed its craft in the battles in the Western Desert and Tunisia. Gladman correctly focuses much attention on the process of timely intelligence acquisition and dissemination. Central to Allied success was the development of properly sized and organized staffs, as well as the necessary communications links. He does not neglect tactics or weaponry; the development of “tank busting” and fighter-bomber versions of the Hurricane fighter is well covered. In some cases, the poor performance of the British Army squandered the gains made in tactical aviation, as at the pivotal Battle of Gazala in May–June 1942. Expanding the scale of operations, as with the Anglo-American TORCH landings in November 1942, necessitated a steep learning curve, as new headquarters and formations scrambled to internalize and apply the hard-won lessons. Nevertheless, he concludes, “[b]y the time of El Alamein in October 1942, the RAF was the most important weapon of the British army” (p. 104). This short book’s crisp argument is enhanced by an excellent Foreword by John Ferris. The 15 maps (murky halftone reproductions of West Point Atlas maps) are, however, somewhat disappointing. If this book has a flaw, it is that it does not always fully explore the many fascinating and worthwhile points it raises. In addition to thoroughly investigating its central topic, Gladman’s book suggests some major reinterpretations of significant turning points in the war in North Africa, offers new assessments of Allied generalship, and makes a bold statement about air power’s overall contribution to Allied victory. One looks forward to the author’s further explorations of these topics. Richard R. Muller USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Maxwell AFB, Alabama Copyright © 2009 The Society for Military History

Overlord's eagles: operations of the United States Army Air Forces in the invasion of Normandy in World War II

Overlord's eagles: operations of the United States Army Air Forces in the invasion of Normandy in World War II

Stalking the U-Boat: USAAF Offensive Antisubmarine Operations in World War II by Max Schoenfeld

262 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Stalking the U-Boat: USAAF Offensive Antisubmarine Operations in World War II. By Max Schoenfeld. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Insti­ tution Press, 1994. Pp. xi+231; illustrations, maps, tables, appendi­ ces, notes, bibliography, index. $37.50 (cloth). The organization of the United States Army Air Force Antisubma­ rine Command (AAFAC) in October 1942 revived the old struggle between the army and the navy over who should control land-based aircraft operating over the sea. Also at issue was the way to conduct anti-U-boat operations. The Battle of the Atlantic was rising to a crescendo in March and April 1943, after which the tide would turn in favor of the Allies. The two groups created to be the AAFAC, the 479th and the 480th, represented the ultimate development of equipment of the day. Their B-24D Liberators with 10-centimetric radar were on the cutting edge of technology as well as being the longest-ranged landplanes available. They were based first in New­ foundland, then in the United Kingdom under the Royal Air Force’s Coastal Command, and finally at Craw Field, Port Lyuatey, North Africa, under the United States Navy. At first the aircraft and crews suffered from their inexperience. Once in Britain, they learned under the expert tutelage of Coastal Command, which was launching its offensive to make crossing the Bay of Biscay hazardous for U-boats. Coastal Command welcomed the B-24s because the Germans hadjust developed Metox, a receiver that could detect the probing waves of the new Leigh-Light Welling­ ton’s radar but which would not be able to detect the 10-centimetric radar carried by the B-24Ds for another year. The USAAF SCR-515, later supplanted by the SCR-717, had a range of from 10 to 20 miles against U-boats and about 40 miles for coastlines. The problem was sea clutter, especially as the aircraft came down to attack heights of 50 to 200 feet above the sea, when the U-boat target would disappear from the radar. Usually by then the submarine was in sight. The problem was to drop depth charges in a line at 100-foot intervals starting ahead of the swirl left by the boat’s conning tower. In order to be lethal, the depth charges had to land very close to the pressure hull within ten seconds of the disap­ pearance of the U-boat. This degree of precision required excellent performance from the crew members concerned to spot, stalk, and attack the rarely sighted boats (the number of hours of patrolling per sighting varied from roughly eighty-seven when Grand-Admiral Karl Doenitz ordered his craft to stay on the surface and fight with their 20-millimeter cannon to over sixteen hundred when he at last ordered them to transit submerged). The problems for the airmen were manifold. They had to home in undetected on a U-boat (a task aided by the sounds of the diesels, which made it impossible for lookouts to hear aircraft) so as to catch it on the surface or onlyjust submerged, as the depth charge fuses TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 263 were set for 25 feet. But there was no low-level bombsight, the B-24s bomb bay doors were fitted with elastic safety latches that would not allow the bombs to be dropped unless the doors were fully opened, the bomb-release gear frequently malfunctioned, and even if all went well the charges might not explode after they entered the wa­ ter. On top of this, the special cameras also failed to function on occasion so that damage assessment had to be based on eye-witness reports. In the great hunting season ofJuly and August 1943, when U-boats stayed on the surface to fight, aircraft began to be lost. More followed when Luftwaffe patrols roamed the Bay of Biscay. The Lib­ erator was well enough armed that it could beat a singleJu-88 or a single FW-200, but usually not more than one. As Max Schoenfeld, earlier a student of Winston Churchill, re­ lates, this was an offensive war against submarines which neither the army nor the...

The Biographical Dictionary of World War II Generals and Flag Officers: The U. S. Armed Forces.

Preface Acknowledgments The United States Army The United States Army Air Force National Guard of the United States The United States Navy The United States Marine Corps The United States Coast Guard Appendix 1: Summary of Birthplaces and Birthdates Appendix 2: Officers Who Died During World War II Index

Double V: The Civil Rights Struggle of the Tuskegee Airmen.

On April 12, 1945, as Americans mourned the death of President Roosevelt, another tragic event went completely unnoticed - the United States Army Air Force arrested 101 African-American officers. They were charged with disobeying a direct order from a superior officer - a charge that carried the death penalty upon conviction. They had refused to sign an order that would have placed them in segregated housing and recreational facilities. Their plight was virtually ignored by the white majority press at the time, and books written about the subject - until now - did not reveal the human rights struggles of these aviators. The central theme of Double V is the promise held out to African-American military personnel that World War II would deliver to them a victory, or double v - over tyranny abroad and racial prejudice at home. The book's authors, Lawrence P. Scott and William M. Womack Sr. chronicle in detail, and for the first time, one of America's most dramatic failures to deliver on that promise. In the course of their narrative the authors demonstrate how the Tuskegee Airmen suffered as second-class citizens while risking their lives to defend their country. Among the contributions made by this work is a detailed examination of how 101 Tuskegee Airmen, by refusing to live in segregated quarters, triggered one of the most significant judicial proceedings in U.S. military history. Double V uses oral accounts and heretofore unused government documents to portray this little-known struggle by one of America's most celebrated flying units. In addition to providing much background material about African-American aviators before World War II, the authors also demonstrate how theTuskegee Airmen's struggle foretold dilemmas that would be faced by the civil rights movement in the second half of the 20th century. It is a work that will be of compelling interest to those who wish to know how America treated minorities during World War II; Double V also is desti

To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942–1944 by Stephen L. McFarland, Wesley P. Newton

958 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Marne in 1914, Canadian troops won a clear-cut victory for the Allied cause by advancing two-and-a-half miles in a matter of three days, thus attaining all of their objectives while suffering a casualty rate of only 16 percent. New weapons, new communications, new tactics, new intelligence methods, and meticulous preparation for the attack made the capture of Vimy Ridge possible; yet some oddly archaic touches in Rawling’s account surely demonstrate a residual rigidity in British (and Cana­ dian) military management. For, as he baldly remarks, “Cavalry did manage to engage the enemy, but suffered heavy casualties from German machine guns” (p. 125). In short, Rawling supports his central thesis convincingly enough, but the positive tone he adopts in describing Canadian technological and organizational responses to the battle experience of World War I strikes me as rather too kind to the brass hats. William H. McNeill Dr. McNeill is professor of history emeritus of the University of Chicago. To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942— 1944. By Stephen L. McFarland and Wesley P. Newton. Washing­ ton, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991. Pp. xiii + 328; illus­ trations, notes, appendix, bibliography, index. $35.00. According to Stephen McFarland and Wesley Newton, the history of the United States Eighth Air Force’s conquest of aerial superiority in protracted struggle against the German Luftwaffe from 1942 through 1944 is the untold story of World War II. Most observers have regarded the securing of aerial superiority as an intermediate step in winning the war, while the air force’s official history of the war essentially disregarded it. In To Command the Sky, McFarland and Newton have written the hrst book to examine the evolution of the doctrine of air superiority, the struggle to gain it over Europe, and its importance for the final victory over Germany. They contend that the answers to the questions of whether and how strategic bombing contributed to Allied victory lie in analysis of the struggle to achieve aerial superiority. In an aerial battle of attrition that they term the “trench warfare” of World War II, the Eighth Air Force forced the Luftwaffe to defend the Reich and then destroyed it in combat, allowing strategic bombing and the Allied invasion of Normandy. The authors begin their story with the origins of the question of aerial superiority in World War I and the evolution of attitudes about the importance of fighter aircraft in the interwar years. After tracing the perceptions of early theorists like Douhet and commanders like Trenchard and Mitchell, they explain that in the 1920s the air arm downgraded pursuit in favor of the bomber, which would secure TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 959 aerial superiority in a precision strategic bombing campaign. When the United States Army Air Force entered the war, it consequently ignored the long-range fighter and adhered to the doctrine that strategic bombers would achieve superiority by striking the sources of aircraft supply and then meeting and beating the Luftwaffe in the air in a frontal assault on Germany. This study is not one-sidedly devoted to American developments. The authors examine German fighter development and fighter pilot training during the 1930s and into World War II, making very clear the tremendous significance—and the usual omission in discussions of the war—of training large numbers of pilots for the coming battle of attrition. McFarland and Newton examine the unfolding of the air opera­ tions over the Continent. In a discussion that is both anecdotal and analytical, they explain the roles of American commanders like Arnold, Eaker, Spaatz, Doolittle, Hunter, and Kepner and the reasons for changes in command. They trace the development of German fighter defenses, the Luftwaffe’s failure to train adequate pilots for attrition warfare, and its weakness in bad weather flight training. They conclude that as of late 1943, after the titanic struggle over Schweinfurt, the Eighth Air Force was losing the war of attrition. German war production was expanding even as the Eighth strove to destroy it. American advocates of the strategic bomber had not recognized the value of aerial superiority and had not realized...

An Organizational Change Triggered by a Survey: The Army Air Forces in World War II

In this article the author examines how during World War II the United States Army Air Forces (AAF) made use of an attitude survey that brought about what was essentially a process of organizational change. The author discusses how the survey yielded results that showed one third of the enlisted men in the AAF felt they were assigned to the wrong jobs. As a result a reform process what begun with the aim of getting the right men into the right positions. The author discusses the success of the program, noting that in a short period of time individuals who scored high on intelligence tests were moved into positions where they could better serve the AAF.

A brief history of meteorological services in Canada part 3: 1939–1945

Abstract When the concerns of the Meteorological Division turned from peace to war in 1939–40 the Division was in the midst of a major expansion to meet the needs of Trans‐Canada Airlines. Civil air requirements for meteorological services continued to increase, and to these were‐added the meteorological needs of the Royal Canadian Air Force for operations and for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, the Royal Air Force and the United States Army Air Force for their ferrying activities over the Atlantic Ocean and to Alaska, and the much smaller needs of the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Army. By developing an analysis and forecasting system based on several forecast centres previously planned for civilian aviation, by setting up still more forecast centres for military purposes and by staffing nearly 100 “dependent” forecast offices at training and operational military stations, the wartime meteorological needs in Canada were largely met, although in northern Canada the United States assisted by establishing many observing stations and some forecast offices. To do this it was necessary for Canada's national service to recruit and train 350 new meteorologists and a large number of assistants during a period of extensive manpower scarcity. Services to the public were greatly curtailed and for a period both the broadcasting and publishing of weather information were prohibited. At the end of the war the Meteorological Division was faced with the major task of reorganizing in order to provide, to the public, services commensurate with the wartime advances in meteorological theory and practice.

Annual oration, 1970. A tribute to Charles M. Gray, M.D. Introduction of orator, William B. Seaman, M.D.

It has been the custom of the Radiological Society of North America to designate its Annual Oration in memory of a Past President of the Society. The Oration today is in memory of Dr. Charles M. Gray. Dr. Gray's practice of radiology was entirely in the city of Tampa, Fla., where he began in 1938 as an Associate with Joseph Dickinson, M.D., who was later a president of the American Roentgen Ray Society. Dr. Dickinson retired in 1956, and between 1956 and early 1961, Dr. Gray practiced alone. He was active in the Florida Radiological Society as well as in the affairs of the Radiological Society. He served on the Board of Directors of our Society, becoming President in 1962. He was a fine and a very understanding man and an excellent radiologist. In his Presidential Address in 1962, Dr. Gray referred to the practice of radiology as a living, ever-changing, ever-advancing part of medicine. He was convinced that the rewards of the private practice of radiology far outweighed its problems, and he felt that in the private office the physician-radiologist could really practice the art of medicine. In our field, in order to be more efficient, more accurate, and more scientific, we must remain conscious of the parting admonition of his Presidential Address, which was that we must demonstrate kindness and gentleness toward our patients. Our Orator for 1971, Dr. William B. Seaman, was born in Chicago, Ill., on Jan. 5, 1917. He lived as a boy in Michigan's Upper Peninsula and received part of his education in that state. He went from the University of Michigan to Harvard Medical School which granted him his M.D. degree in 1941. After an internship at the University of Chicago Clinics, Billings Hospital, he took a residency in radiology at the Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, Conn. Between 1942 and 1946, he was a flight surgeon in the United States Army Air Force, but he returned to Yale to finish his training in radiology. He stayed on as assistant in radiology and instructor until June 30, 1949. On July 1, 1949, Dr. Seaman became instructor—and later advanced to a Professorship—of Radiology at the Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, Mo. On Sept. 1, 1956, he became Professor of Radiology and Chairman of the Department of the College of Physicians and Surgeons at Columbia University, where he has since remained. Dr. Seaman is a member of all the national radiological societies and has been President of the Association of University Radiologists and the New York Roentgen Society. He has also been active on many committees in the American College of Radiology and has been an examiner on the American Board of Radiology. Dr. Seaman has an extensive bibliography and is perhaps best known for his work on the upper esophagus. He is a working member of a busy department and continues to do his share of the day-to-day production of radiologic service for the patients in his hospital.

Advanced Research and Development Facility

WHEN, at the conclusion of the Second World War, the startling accomplishments of the Germans in terms of aero‐nautical research and development were fully appreciated, steps were taken in the United States to ensure that adequate facilities would be available to maintain a position in the van of progress. To this end construction began in 1950 on the Arnold Engineering Development Centre with the aim of providing laboratories for the testing of aircraft, missiles, space‐vehicles and their propulsion units over a wide range of conditions. The Centre is named after General Arnold who commanded the United States Army Air Forces in World War 11.

Irregular Earthworks in Eastern Siam: an air survey

During the war and in the immediate post-war period the Royal Air Force and the United States Army Air Force undertook a considerable air survey programme covering Burma, Siam and French Indo-China. In Siam the initial cover was restricted to large-scale (1:15,000 and better) photographs of towns, airfields and communications. Later a more ambitious programme of survey cover (scales 1 : 50,000 and 1 : 25,000 with a few towns and beaches at larger scale) was undertaken, and practically the whole of the country has been covered by air photographs of one scale or another.It has been my privilege to serve with the R.A.F. in Siam on both ground and flying duties and, more recently, to be in a position to examine most of the photographs taken. A very considerable number of archaeological sites have come to light, many being noted for the first time ; and it is my intention in this initial paper to comment briefly on one particular type of earthwork which appears to have a limited distribution in eastern Siam. The air photographs are reproduced with the sanction of the Air Ministry.It must be emphasized that although Siam, the meeting place of Indian and Chinese cultures, is rich in archaeological sites very little systematic work has yet been undertaken. On the one side the natural reluctance of the Siamese to disturb ancient sites and, on the other, comparative absence of trained archaeological research workers have been contributory factors. Detailed ground information generally is lacking and it follows that these notes are based on air photographic evidence, in most cases without ground checking, an impropriety of which the writer is only too well aware.

Mass miniature radiography; a survey in the United States Army Air Forces.

Mass miniature radiography; a survey in the United States Army Air Forces.

American Upper Air Cosmic Ray Expedition

THE National Geographic Society, the United States Army Air Force and the Bartol Research Foundation will jointly conduct a series of four round-trip nights in a specially equipped B-29 bomber to investigate the variation with latitude and longitude of cosmic ray intensities. The flights will extend between lat. 50° N. and the magnetic equator, some 20° south of the geographic equator ; and studies will be made at altitudes of 5,000, 15,000, 25,000 and 35,000 ft. The trips will not necessarily be continuous, and parts of each flight may even be made at different levels so long as complete round trips at each of the four altitudes can be pieced together. The principal apparatus to be carried in the plane, consisting of multiple banks of Geiger counters, has been designed by Dr. W. F. G. Swann, director of the Bartol Research Foundation. The counters are so arranged that they will record only the particles which move downward vertically. It is hoped to discover the pattern of cosmic ray intensity in a cross-section of the atmosphere extending 4,800 miles northward from the magnetic equator, and reaching from sea-level more than 6½ miles high, and so learn more about the nature of the primary particles entering the atmosphere and breaking down there to form mesotrons. The investigations will be carried out under the direction of Dr. Lyman J. Briggs, chairman of the Research Committee of the National Geographic Society and formerly director of the National Bureau of Standards. The Army Air Force's co-operation in the project is under the supervision of Major-General Curtis E. Le May, deputy chief of staff in charge of research ; the activities of the Bartol Research Foundation will be in charge of Dr. W. F. G. Swann.

Vertical control surveys for reconnaissance maps

Much of the previously unmapped area of the world has now been covered with high oblique aerial photography by the United States Army Air Forces. Future expeditious use of these data for the preparation of reconnaissance topographic maps requires several known elevations per hundred square miles. An economical method of developing such control is described herein.

The Atomic Bomb

A PAMPHLET, "Statements relating to the Atomic Bomb", published by H.M. Stationery Office (price 4d. net), gives some account of the activity in Great Britain and the United States leading to the use of this weapon in Japan by the United States Army Air Force. Reference is made to statements issued by the United States and Canadian Governments giving an account of the work carried out in these countries which led up to or was associated with the achievement, and an outline of the scientific background. The statement includes a brief summary of earlier work on nuclear disintegration which bears only indirectly on the phenomenon of nuclear fission, on which the activity of the atomic bomb depends, and then gives some account of the work on the fission of uranium nuclei, published prior to the beginning of the War, and the development of which on a large scale led to the atomic bomb.